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Legal academics and political scientists continue to debate whether the
legal, attitudinal, or strategic model best explains judicial decision making.
One limitation in this debate is the high-court bias found in most studies.
This article, by contrast, examines federal district court decisions, specifically interpretations of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
Initial interpretations of the Act articulated distinct liberal and conservative
positions. The data compiled here support the hypothesis that the later
emergence of an intermediate interpretation was the result of strategic
statutory interpretation rather than simply judges acting consistently with
their ideological preferences, although there is some evidence that judges
adopting the most conservative interpretation of the Act were acting consistently with the attitudinal model. There is weaker evidence to support the
legal model, an unsurprising result given the severe test the study design
creates for that model.

Legal academics and political scientists continue to debate three rival theories of judicial decision making. Consider a common decision making
setting-interpreting a newly enacted statute. Under the traditional legal
model, the court interpreting the statute makes a reasoned decision based
on generally recognized and legitimate sources of authority, without refer-
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ence to the judge's own ideological beliefs.' Many political scientists, by
contrast, deride the legal model as little more than a myth perpetrated to
legitimate judicial power. 2 These attitudinalists argue that judges have a
great deal of discretionary authority that they use to inject their ideological
preferences into their decisions.' Empirical studies have repeatedly shown
that ideology matters, although it is not outcome determinative;4 as a result,
the attitudinal model largely dominates judicial politics.5
In recent years, however, some positive political theorists have challenged the attitudinal model's hegemony by attempting to show that judges
are strategic actors whose decisions, while goal oriented, are influenced by
and dependent on the choices of other political actors and by their institutional settings.6 Strategic judges are theoretically willing to move from their
ideal position based on the individualized dynamics of the decisional setting.7 Attitudinalists retort that judges have a relatively free rein to ignore
such influences and suggest that strategic models "have been spectacularly
unsuccessful when subjected to empirical testing."8

1

See Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 27-57 (University of Chicago Press,
1949).
2

Political scientists have described legal reasoning as a "low form of rational behavior" akin to
"creative writing, necromancy, or finger painting." Harold J. Spaeth, Supreme Court Policy
Making: Explanation and Prediction 64 (1979).
'See C. Herman Pritchett et al., The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior 53-192 (Nancy L. Maveety
ed., 2003);Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
(Cambridge University Press 2002).
4

See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1459,
1479-82 (2003).
5

See Lee Epstein &Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back,
A Look Ahead, 53 Pol. Res. Q. 625, 634 (2000).
6

See, e.g., Lee Epstein &Jack Knight, The ChoicesJustices Make 10 (1997); Forrest Maltzman,
James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy andJudicial Choice: New Institutional
Approaches to Supreme Court Decision Making, in Supreme Court Decision Making: New
Institutional Approaches 46 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
7

See Lee Epstein & Thomas G. Walker, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Society:
Playing the Reconstruction Game, in Contemplating Courts 315, 322 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
8

Cornell W. Clayton, The Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (Or, Why be
so Positive about the Judicialization of Politics?), 65 L. & Contemp. Probs. 69, 83 (2002);
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A notable shortcoming in this debate is the high-court bias found in
past studies, which tend to focus almost exclusively on appellate courts.9 The
results of these studies are not necessarily generalizable to decision making
at the district court level, where most judicial activity occurs. Although there
have been a number of studies suggesting that judicial ideology is a significant determinant of lower court decision making, only a few scholars have
attempted to evaluate the legal model in federal district courts' ° and none
appear to have tested whether district courts engage in strategic statutory
interpretation."
This article addresses this gap in the literature by assessing whether
federal district courtjudges' statutory interpretations are consistent with one
of the three models. The specific setting is a sample of 268 decisions on
motions to dismiss in securities fraud lawsuits. The decisions interpret the
heightened pleading requirement of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (the PSLRA or the Act) 12 in situations where the relevant
circuit court had not yet interpreted the Act.
This setting provides a fertile ground for examining the competing
models of judicial decision making for three reasons. First, the PSLRA and
securities litigation are ideologically contested, with conservatives (as that
term is typically used) generally viewing securities fraud actions as predomi-

Cross, supra note 4, at 1509-12 (finding no evidence that federal courts of appeals act
strategically).
'See Nancy L. Maveety, The Study ofJudicial Behavior and the Discipline of Political Science, in
The Pioneers of Judicial Behavior 18 (Nancy L. Maveety ed., 2003).
"See, e.g., Gregory C.Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1377 (1998).
"See Epstein & Knight, supra note 5, at 650.
12

Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). There
appears to be only one existing empirical study that examines the impact of ideology on
interpretations of the pleading standard. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with
Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation,
54 Stan. L. Rev. 627 (2002). Using a sample of 167 interpretations of the pleading standard, the
authors find that judges appointed by Presidents Carter, Ford, and Nixon were more likely to
adopt a pro-plaintiff interpretation of that standard. They note that "[t]his latter observation is
inconsistent with a pure Democrat-Republican dichotomization of the bench. It instead suggests
that, to the extent political factors correlate with judicial decisionmaking, it may be necessary to
adopt a more refined description of the judicial process." Id. at 635. This article attempts just
such a description.
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nantly strike suits, and liberals (again, as that term is typically used) generally
viewing such actions as a necessary supplement to inadequate governmental
enforcement resources. Second, in each of these cases the district judges
were confronted with precisely the same legal issue 3 and had a broad
interpretational space in which to work because opinion over the exact
requirements of the standard was sharply divided.' 4 Finally, the observed
pattern of case law development provides a quasi-natural experiment for
testing the competing judicial decision-making theories. In the earliest decisions, district courts staked out two widely divergent views-a liberal interpretation that was the least restrictive possible under the statutory language
and a conservative interpretation that appeared to raise the bar significantly
higher for plaintiffs trying to survive a motion to dismiss. Later, a third,
intermediate approach emerged that became, by some measures, the prevailing approach.
Consequently, any of the three models might explain the emergence of
this intermediate standard. The intermediate standard may have come to
dominate because courts viewed it as the best and most persuasive reading of
a vague and ambiguous statute. Different interpretations could have been
driven by ideological differences in the district courts. It is also possible that
judges opting for the intermediate standard were acting strategically. They
may have preferred the liberal (conservative) approach but articulated a
marginally more (less) restrictive standard in an attempt to avoid reversal by
an ideologically dissimilar appellate court.
To analyze these competing explanations, this article proceeds as
follows. Section I provides background information on securities fraud
actions, the PSLRA, and the pattern of case law development. Section II
reviews the literature on the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models in order
to develop several empirically testable hypotheses linking these theories to
the emergence of the intermediate standard. Section II also discusses the
variables employed in the study. Section III discusses the empirical results.
The data suggest that strategic considerations played the largest role in the

'"The study is thus similar to Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, who use decisions on the constitutionality
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to study the impact of a variety of judicial characteristics
on outcomes. See Sisk et al., supra note 10; see also Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial
Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission? 7J. L. Econ. & Org.
183 (1991).
4
See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 273, 293-94 (1998).
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decision to adopt the intermediate standard. Liberal and conservative judges
sitting in ideologically dissimilar circuits were significantly more likely to
adopt the intermediate standard than were other judges. At the same time,
some evidence suggests that the judges opting for the most conservative
interpretation were acting consistently with the attitudinal model. There is
weaker evidence of the legal model, an unsurprising result given the severe
test the study design creates for that model. Section IV discusses these results
and outlines avenues for future research. Section V contains brief concluding remarks.

I. SECURITIES LITIGATION AND THE

PSLRA

Private securities litigation has been the subject of a continuing public policy
debate since at least the mid-1970s. 15 Proponents of private enforcement of
the federal securities laws contend that "[p]rivate securities litigation
... help [s] to deter wrongdoing" and "is an indispensable tool with which
defrauded investors can recover their losses without having to rely upon
government action."' 6 Critics counter that plaintiffs' lawyers typically control
these cases and thus have incentives to act primarily in their own self-interest,
often to the detriment of the deterrent and compensation functions that
7
private litigation is supposed to perform.
Securities litigation reform became a plank in the Republican Party's
Contract with America in 1994.18 After Republicans gained control of
Congress in the 1994 mid-term elections, the 104th Congress passed the
PSLRA, the only statute enacted over a presidential veto during the Clinton
Administration.
The PSLRA's heightened pleading standard was one of the Act's more
controversial provisions. The most salient statutory requirement is that plaintiffs must "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
5

See Perino, supra note 14, at 288-89.

16

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369 at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730.

' 7SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorneys Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1 (1991).
"SNewt Gingrich, Bob Schellhas, Ed Gillespie, Richard K. Armey, Contract with America: The
Bold Plan 150-51 (1994).
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the defendant acted with the required state of mind."19 The statute's language was clearly drawn from a standard the Second Circuit applied prior to
passage of the PSLRA, which plaintiffs could satisfy by pleading specific facts
demonstrating that defendants had both the motive and the opportunity to
commit fraud.2" This standard was generally acknowledged to be the most
stringent in use at the time the PSLRA was debated; nonetheless, Republicans inserted language in the conference report suggesting that the PSLRA's
pleading barrier was actually higher than the Second Circuit standard.2'
This language sparked a heated debate over how Congress intended
courts to apply the new standard. Remarkably, given the arcane nature of the
issue, President Clinton cited that legislative history as a reason for his
decision to veto the Act. He stated that he would support a standard that was
no higher than the Second Circuit standard.22 Congress overrode the president's veto, but it remained unclear what interpretation of the Act should
control.
In the earliest cases, courts staked out two distinctly different positions.
Some courts held that the PSLRA standard was equivalent to the Second
Circuit standard.23 By contrast, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Securities Litigation
held that the PSLRA did not codify the Second Circuit standard and that
allegations of motive and opportunity were never sufficient to demonstrate a
strong inference of fraudulent intent.24
Following Silicon Graphics,courts interpreting the PSLRA were left with
four distinct choices. As Table 1 shows, about 32 percent of the decisions in

1915 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
21See, e.g., Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128-30 (2d Cir. 1994).
21

See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-369 at 41. In particular, the teport observed the need to establish
"more stringent pleading standards to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits" and noted that the
conference committee did "not intend to codify the Second Circuit's case law interpreting this
pleading standard." Id.
22

See President's Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without Approval the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 31 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 2210 (Dec. 19, 1995),
reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S19034 (Dec. 21, 1995).
23

See, e.g., Marksman Partners, L.P. v. Chantal Pharm. Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1297 (C.D. Cal.
1996); Zeid v. Kimberley, 930 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
2

1In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 1996 WL 664639 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 1996); In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc. Sec. Litig., 970 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Cal. 1997), afid, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Table 1:

Distribution of Statutory Interpretation Decisions in Sample

Cases (% total)

No Standard

Second Circuit

Intermediate

Silicon Graphics

Total

86 (32.1%)

101 (37.7%)

64 (23.9%)

17 (6.3%)

268 (100%)

Motion to dismiss decisions in securities fraud actions available on Westlaw and Lexis
and decided between January 1, 1996 and July 31, 2004.
SOURCE:

the sample chose to avoid the issue by holding that under any pleading
standard the complaint was either sufficient or insufficient. 25 About 38
percent adopted the Second Circuit standard, while only about 6 percent
chose to follow Silicon Graphics. The remaining 24 percent set a different,
intermediate course. In those cases, the courts generally held that, while the
PSLRA did not codify the Second Circuit standard, allegations of motive and
opportunity could under certain circumstances give rise to a strong inference of fraud. 26 This intermediate approach has predominated among
circuit courts, with eight of the eleven circuits that have analyzed the issue
adopting that standard.

27

Congress reentered this interpretational morass in 1998 in connection
with passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) .28
SLUSA preempts certain state securities class actions and was designed to
29
stem a shift of these cases from federal to state court. To secure White
House approval, 0 Congress agreed to include legislative history in SLUSA

25

See, e.g., In re FAC Realty Corp., 990 F. Supp. 416 (E.D.N.C. 1997). This kind of decision may
also be a strategic attempt to avoid reversal. See infra note 61.
26

See, e.g., In re Baesa Sec. Litig., 969 F. Supp. 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).

27

See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006); Ottmann v.
Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2003); Florida State Bd. of Admin. v.
Green Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400
(5th Cir. 2001); City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001); Greebel v. FTP
Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th
Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
2

SPub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).

'See Perino, supra note 14, at 307-18.
'Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S. 1260, 34 Weekly Comp. Presidential
Docs. 2247 (Nov. 9, 1998).
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stating that the PSLRA intended to codify the Second Circuit standard."
Although some courts cited this language, many courts noted the traditional
view that courts interpreting statutes should generally discount congres3' 2
sional attempts to create postenactment legislative "history.
As previously noted, the legal, attitudinal, or strategic models could
each explain the emergence of the intermediate standard. A proponent of
the legal model might suggest that the spread of the intermediate standard
was the product of judges who were persuaded by the reasoning of earlier
cases. As the weight of precedent in favor of the standard grew, other courts
became increasingly likely to adopt it. An attitudinalist, by contrast, could
hypothesize that the varying standards might be explained by the ideology
of the judges. Those opting for the Second Circuit or Silicon Graphics
approaches may have been, respectively, liberal and conservative, while the
intermediate approach may have come from moderate judges. It is also
possible that judges opting for the intermediate standard were acting strategically. They may have preferred, perhaps, the Second Circuit approach
but articulated a marginally more restrictive standard in an attempt to avoid
reversal by a more conservative court of appeals.

II. TESTING THE IMPACT OF LAW, IDEOLOGY,
AND STRATEGY
This article tests these rival hypotheses using a binary logistic regression
model, with the decision to adopt the intermediate standard (INTERMEDIATE) as the dependent variable." This section discusses the explanatory
variables used in the models and the methodological issues associated with
specifying them.

'IS.

Rep. No. 105-182 at 5-6 (1998).

"2See Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974).
"The standards courts adopted have a natural order (least to most restrictive), suggesting that
ordinal, rather than logistic, regression might be a useful approach. I chose not to use ordinal
regression because it is unclear how cases that did not adopt a standard should be ranked. Still
another potential approach would have been to use a multinomial logistic regression, which
would not have required combining all the nonintermediate cases into one group. That method
was rejected because the small number of cases adopting the Silicon Graphicsstandard were
clustered in the Ninth Circuit over a relatively short period of time, meaning that there was
insufficient variation in the data to make the multinomial procedure optimal.

Law, Ideology, and Strategy inJudicialDecision Making
A. The Legal Model
The legal model posits that judicial decision making flows from reasoned
analysis of generally recognized and legitimate sources of legal authority.34
As with the PSLRA, the first courts interpreting a statute may reach inconsistent decisions. Over time, however, other judges will look to the existing
precedents and will rely on the most persuasive reading of the statute and
not simply the one that most closely accords with their own policy preferences. Eventually, a predominant interpretation will emerge through a
process that is frequently described in evolutionary terms.35 In the strong
form of the legal model, ideology plays no role in this developmental
process. Contemporary commentators, however, recognize that judges'
worldviews necessarily inform their decisions but, they contend, only in a
small category of truly indeterminate cases. 6
The conception of the legal model as iterative, experimental, and
largely divorced from personal ideological preferences is often missing from
empirical studies of judicial decision making. Many empirical studies purporting to find that the legal model has no explanatory power were in truth
testing and rejecting the antiquated conception ofjudicial decision making
as a mechanistic process through which judges find and apply clear and
determinate rules." Law is not completely determinate and different judges
using the same legal materials can and do reach different conclusions, but
that does not necessarily mean that the legal model has no influence on
judicial decision making. Law can still act as a constraint that limits the
discretionary space in which ajudge may operate.3 8 Whether by socialization,
self-selection, or screening, it is certainly possible that judges derive at least

"4John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law, 2d ed. (Beacon Press 1963).
"See, e.g., Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 22 (1921) ("Not all the
progeny of principles begotten of ajudgment survive, however, to maturity. Those that cannot
prove their worth and strength by the test of experience are sacrificed mercilessly and thrown
into the void.").
36

See, e.g., Jon 0. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The Legitimacy of
Institutional Values, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 200, 204 (1984).
7

See Howard Gillman, What's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the "Legal
Model" ofJudicial Decision Making, 26 L. & Soc. Inquiry 465, 471-75 (2001).
1

3

See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate

Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. L. Rev. 251, 299 (1997).
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some utility from playing the judicial game according to its established
rules."9
That being said, the setting for this article-district court interpretations of a vague statute made in the absence of controlling superior court
authority-represents a severe test for the legal model. This bias in the
study design suggests that any empirical support for the legal model would
be surprising and perhaps indicative that the legal model has greater force
in more routine district court decision making. Although the pull of the
legal model might be weaker in this setting, existing survey evidence suggests that it still exists. In such settings, judges claim that the closest precedent in the circuit or the closest precedent in any circuit are important
determinants ofjudicial decision making.4" Other empirical work finds that
horizontal precedent (i.e., the decisions of other district courts within the
circuit) was significant in explaining district courts' statutory interpretation
decisions.41
Here, four variables are used to test whether the emergence of the
intermediate standard is consistent with the legal model. Following Sisk,
Heise, and Morriss, CIRCUIT PRECEDENT measures the extent of support for
the intermediate standard within the circuit in which the district court is
located.42 If the legal model is correct, then this variable should be positively
correlated with the decision to opt for the intermediate standard. OTHER
CIRCUIT PRECEDENT measures the growing weight of circuit court precedent
for the intermediate standard.43 If horizontal circuit precedents are a significant explanatory variable, then all other things being equal, OTHER CIRCUIT
9

Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 133 (1995).

4J. Woodford Howard, Courts of Appeals in the Federal Judicial System 165 (1981).
41

Sisk et al., supra note 10, at 1427; see also David E. Klein, Making Law in the United States

Courts of Appeals 75-76 (2002).
is calculated by subtracting the number of prior, nonintermediate precedents within each circuit from the number of prior intermediate precedents, multiplying the
result by the absolute value of the difference, and dividing the result by the total number of
prior decisions in the circuit. Using this methodology preserves the sign of the result and
distinguishes between situations in which a single precedent exists and those with a margin of
one among multiple precedents. See Sisk et al., supra note 10, at 1428-29.
42CIRCUIT PRECEDENT

43

OTHER CIRCUIT PRECEDENT is the number of circuit courts adopting the intermediate standard
at the time of the decision divided by the total number of circuit decisions interpreting the
PSLRA.
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should also be positively associated with the decision to adopt the
intermediate standard.
SLUSA is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the decision
came down after passage of SLUSA and 0 otherwise. If the legal model is
correct, this variable should be negatively correlated with the decision to
adopt the intermediate standard. Once Congress signaled its view that the
Second Circuit standard should control, the legal model would suggest that,
all things being equal, courts should be less likely to adopt an alternative
approach like the intermediate standard. Still, because courts often claim to
discount this kind of postenactment legislative history, the impact of
SLUSA's legislative history should be smaller than the impact of other legal
model variables. Finally, PREVIOUS 2D CIRCUIT is an indicator variable that
takes a value of 1 if the circuit court had adopted the Second Circuit
standard in pre-PSLRA cases and 0 otherwise. If courts look to the closest
precedent in the circuit, then this variable should be negatively correlated
with the decision to adopt the intermediate standard.
PRECEDENT

B. The Attitudinal Model

The attitudinal model posits that judges act predominantly on the basis of
their own ideological preferences. Although district courts are likely to face
a substantial number of routine cases where the judge has no preferred
ideological position, there is empirical support that links judicial ideology to
case outcomes at the district level." If the districtjudge's ideology played the
dominant role, then we should expect to see a close correlation between the
ideology of the district court and the standard chosen. In other words, we
should see, all other things being equal, liberal judges opting for the Second
Circuit standard, moderatejudges opting for the intermediate standard, and
conservative judges opting for the Silicon Graphics standard.
The key methodological problem in testing the attitudinal model is
obtaining a reliable and accurate measure ofjudicial ideology. Most studies
"See, e.g., C.K Rowland & Robert A. Carp, Politics and Judgment in Federal District Courts
30-31 (1996) (finding that Democratic judges were more likely to render liberal decisions on
civil rights, labor, and economic issues than were Republican judges); but see Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of District-Level Judicial
Demographics, 34J. Legal Stud. 57 (2005) (finding little evidence that political composition of
district affects sentencing disparities); Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1995) (finding

political party of appointing president was an insignificant explanatory variable in study of more
than 2,500 civil rights and prisoner cases).
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of the impact of ideology on lower courts rely on the party of the appointing
president as a proxy for thejudge's ideology.45 But, as Epstein and King note,
there are a number of reasons for questioning the standard methodology.46
A dichotomous variable obviously masks considerable variation among both
appointing presidents and judges. Presidents frequently use their nominating powers to push partisan or personal, rather than ideological, agendas.47
The president's party also fails to account for the impact of senatorial
courtesy, the practice of deferring to home-state senators from the president's party with respect to judicial nominations.4" Even in states with two
out-party senators, presidents may have reciprocal arrangements on appointment matters.49
To address these concerns, the ideological measure used here (DISTRICT IDEOLOGY) relies on a modified version of the methodology recently
developed by Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers.5" Under this methodology,
judges' ideological scores are derived from Poole common-space scores, a
preexisting scale used in the political science literature for presidential and
senatorial ideology scores. 51 Common-space scores are calculated using sena-

45

See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 Yale L.J. 2155 (1998); Richard
L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717, 1718
(1997); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michele Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va. L. Rev. 301 (2004). Grundfest and
Pritchard used this measure in their study of decisions in securities class actions as well as
dummy variables for specific appointing presidents. See Grundfest & Pritchard, supra note 12,
at 693.
46

Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 87-96 (2000).

47

Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt Through

Reagan 3-4 (1997).
'Rowland & Carp, supra note 44, at 87-116; Goldman, supra note 47, at 10.
4

9For example, President Nixon had an arrangement with California's two Democratic senators
pursuant to which Nixon gave the senators the right to name every fourth appointment in
exchange for their support of every three Nixon appointees. Donald Dale Jackson, Judges 261
(1974).
'Michael W. Giles, Virginia Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on
Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 Pol. Res. Q 623 (2001).
51

See Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call
Voting (1997); Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 Am.J. Pol.
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tors' role-call votes and measure ideology on a scale of-1 (for most liberal)
to +1 (for most conservative). Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers do not appear to
have created common-space scores for district judges, nor does their methodology adequately consider the influence that out-party senators may have
on the appointment of district court judges. For these reasons, this article
calculates common-space scores for district judges based not only on the
president's and home-state senators' ideological scores, but also on the
judge's political party.52
If the attitudinal model is correct, then moderate judges should be the
most likely to adopt the intermediate standard. Because DISTRICT IDEOLOGY
is the absolute value of the judge's ideological score, there should be a
significant, negative correlation between DISTRICT IDEOLOGY and the dependent variable INTERMEDIATE-moderate judges should be more likely than
their conservative or liberal counterparts to adopt the intermediate
standard.

C. The Strategic Model

The strategic model differs from the attitudinal model because in the strategic account, judges "are not unconstrained actors who make decisions
based only on their own ideological attitudes. Rather, [judges] are strategic
actors who realize that their ability to achieve goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to
make, and the institutional context in which they act."5"

Sci. 954 (1998). The analysis in this article uses the Poole common-space scores for the 75th
through the 107th Congresses, which are available at (ftp://pooleandrosenthal.com/Junkord/
BL75107.xls).
52

Specifically, I assign the judge the absolute value of the common-space score as follows: (1) if

there is no senator from the president's party in the state and the president appoints a judge

from his party or if the judge's party affiliation is unavailable, the president's common-space
score is used; (2) if there is no or one senator from the president's party and the president
appoints ajudge from the other party, the common-space score of the out-party senator is used;
(3) if there are one or two senators from the president's party and ajudge from the same party
is appointed or if the judge's party affiliation is unavailable, the common-space score of the
home senator is used. If there are two senators from the same party, the mean score for the
senators is used.
53

Epstein & Knight, supra note 6, at 10.
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SOURCE: Lee Epstein &Jack Knight, "Toward a Strategic Revolution injudicial Politics: A Look
Back, A Look Ahead," 53 Pol. Res. Q. 625, 650 (2000).

One of the more well known of these models is Eskridge's model of
strategic statutory interpretation in the Supreme Court. 4 Eskridge argues that
if the Court wants to establish a policy that is as close as possible to the one it
prefers, it must take into account what Congress (which has the power to
overturn its statutory decisions) and the president will do in response to its
interpretation. Figure 1 illustrates this relationship. The model assumes that
all the actors have complete information about the other actors' preferences
and that each actor has a single-peaked utility function. J represents the
preference of the median member of the Court, P the president's preferred
point, and M the median member of Congress's preferred point. C is the
preference of the relevant congressional committee, while C(M) represents its
indifference point-the point at which it is indifferent between its preferred
position and the preferred position of the median member of Congress.
In Figure 1, the Court's preferred policy position Jis to the left of all
other players. If the Court decides consistently with its preference, the
committee will introduce legislation to override the decision, which Congress and the president will favor. If, by contrast, the Court modifies its
position to C(M), there will be no statutory override because the relevant
committee is indifferent as between this point and its preferred position.
Setting the policy in this way avoids the potential that a statutory override will
result in a policy that is to the right of C(M).
This kind of strategic model has an intuitive appeal; however, critics
argue that strategic models "have been spectacularly unsuccessful when
subjected to empirical testing."55 Many attitudinal scholars recognize that
judges have the ability to act strategically, but suggest thatjudges rarely need
to do so because responses from other political actors are rare and because
'William

N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101

Yale LJ. 331 (1991).
t

" See Clayton, supra note 8, at 83 (2002); Cross, supra note 4, at 1489 (finding no evidence that
federal courts of appeals act strategically).
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judges are not harmed personally if they are reversed (other than perhaps a
hypothesized loss of reputational capital).56
These critiques, however, may not be generalizable to district judges.
Appellate court review of their statutory interpretations is far more likely
than congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions and will occur
under a nondeferential de novo standard. There thus appears to be little
basis for claiming that the district court can safely ignore the court of
appeals' preferences. Moreover, district judges may be able to derive more
tangible benefits from strategic decision making than Supreme Court justices. Reversals may limit promotion opportunities for district judges, an
irrelevant consideration for Supreme Courtjustices. 57 The district court may
also be able to achieve tangible gains from its preferred policy. Statutory
interpretations affect not only the litigants who bring cases, but also the
district court, which will have the primary burden of administering the
statute. A particular statutory interpretation might reduce the court's workload or make the cases it does handle easier to process. Under these conditions, rational district judges may find it advantageous to adopt strategies
that increase the chances that the appellate court will adopt statutory interpretations that are reasonably close to the policies the lower courts prefer.
But are such strategic responses even available to district judges given
the vast structural differences that exist in the relationship between district
and circuit courts as opposed to the Supreme Court and Congress? To be
sure, both relationships can be modeled in accordance with familiar
principal-agent terms because in each the principal has the ability to alter
the interpretations of the agent. Nonetheless, the mechanisms for implementing that override power are quite different. Congress's override power
is not self-actualizing; invoking it requires an initial affirmative step, typically
the introduction of legislation by a member of the relevant committee. As a
result, the Court is likely to have some discretionary space in which to
operate because the transaction and opportunity costs of the override
process may cause Congress not to take action.5 s
5

6See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and
Courts, 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 28, 31 (1997).
57

See Sisk et al., supra note 10, at 1423. For other views on judges' aversion to reversal, see
Posner, supra note 39, at 112-13, 118-19 (citing studies).

5See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 Wash. U.
L.Q. 1, 96 (1994); Segal, supra note 56, at 31.
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By contrast, in the majority of cases, the court of appeals does not have
discretionaryjurisdiction. Under these circumstances, why would a court of
appeals with distinct policy preferences be willing to accept a compromise
position? In part, the answer to that question may turn on the fact that the
court of appeals is a "they," not an "it." " The outcome of any appeal will
depend at least to a degree on the three-person panel that hears the case.
Consider the example of a liberal district courtjudge sitting in a circuit that
was predominantly conservative, but that contained some moderate and
liberal judges as well. Empirical studies show that when panels are ideologically consistent (e.g., a panel of three conservative judges), decisions tend to
be more ideologically extreme because the judges' policy preferences tend
to reinforce one another.6" If mixed or moderate panels are the norm, it is
reasonable to expect that districtjudges may benefit from acting strategically
because the probability of the circuit court accepting the intermediate position should increase.

6

1

To test this, I calculated the probability of a mixed or moderate ideological panel for each circuit in the years during which cases from that circuit
appear in the database. Probabilities are based on all active judges and active

"See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent as an Oxymoron,
12 Int'l Rev. of L. & Econ. 239 (1992).
'See, e.g., Cross & Tiller, supra note 45, at 2156.
6

There is another potential strategic explanation. Rather than offering a compromise legal
interpretation in an attempt to establish a policy that is as close as possible to the districtjudge's
policy preferences, judges could be strategically attempting to predict the position the court of
appeals is likely to adopt so as to lessen the probability that they will be reversed. If mixed or
moderate appellate panels are the norm, then a districtjudge engaging in this sort of expected
probability calculation might well decide to adopt an intermediate interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Although there does not appear to be a ready method for distinguishing empirically
between these motivations, it seems plausible that the strategy here is based more on policy
preferences and less on fear of reversal. The reason is that ifjudges were primarily motivated by
fear of reversal, they would have a much simpler strategy than attempting to engage in a highly
complex and indeterminate probabilistic analysis of the likely interpretation that some as yet
unknown panel will adopt. They could, instead, simply decide not to decide. Indeed, as shown
in Table 1, that is precisely what 32 percent of the judges in the sample did. By taking no
position on the proper interpretation of the statute, they ensured that they could not be
overturned on that basis. Even if the motivation for adopting the intermediate standard is an
attempt to avoid reversal, this fact does not undermine the proposed test for strategic decision
making. After all, suchjudges are still acting strategically, and thus inconsistently with either the
legal or attitudinal models.
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Table 2: Probability by Circuit of Mixed or Moderate Ideology Three-Judge
Panels (1996-2004)
1996

1997

1998

1999

2d Cir.
3d Cir.

0.958
0.931
0.979

0.958
0.900
0.976

0.908
0.730
0.979

0.869
0.749
0.971

4th Cir.
5th Cir.

0.784
0.757

0.813
0.757

0.871
0.786

0.893
0.786

6th Cir.

0.791

0.815

0.790

0.790

7th Cir.
8th Cir.

0.705
0.951

0.901
0.951

0.874
0.909

0.914
0.915

9th Cir.

0.929

0.911

0.917

0.913

10th Cir.

0.847

0.855

0.807

0.835

l1th Cir.

0.746

0.878

0.841

0.874

1st Cir.

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.864
0.769
-

0.901
0.909
-

0.835
-

0.823
0.736
-

0.874
0.895
-

0.835
-

0.790
-

0.901
-

0.758
-

0.874
-

-

0.843
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

SOURCE: Federal Judicial Center, FederalJudge's Biographical Database, Poole Common Space
Scores (ftp://pooleandrosenthal.com/junkord/BL75107.DAT); U.S. Administrative Office,
Federal Court Management Statistics, Biographical Directoy of the United States Congress (1774 to
Present); Lexis.

seniorjudges serving in a circuit62 who were classified as liberal, moderate, or
conservative based on the common-space score assigned to the judge."5
Table 2 reports the results. The probability of a mixed or moderate ideological panel is high across circuits. None of the cells in Table 2 has a
probability lower than 0.7, including what are traditionally viewed as conservative circuits. Indeed, in nearly 73 percent of the cells, the probability of
getting a mixed or moderate ideological panel exceeds 0.8. Consequently, it
62

Judges were included if they served at any time during that year. Some senior judges were
included because during the study period resident seniorjudges typically accounted for about
15 percent of case participations on the U.S. courts of appeals. See Judicial Facts and Figures,
Table 1.7 (available at (www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/tablel.07.pdf)). The activity level
among seniorjudges varies greatly, however. To determine whether a seniorjudge should be
included, I relied on 28 U.S.C. § 371(c), which provides that seniorjudges are entitled to the
same pay increases as active judges if they handle a caseload that is at least 25 percent of that of
an average active judge. Accordingly, U.S. Administrative Office data were used to calculate the
average caseload for each judge by circuit over the period from 1997-2004. The names of senior
judges were then searched in Lexis to determine whether they served on the requisite number
of panels in a given year.
63 Judges were classified into liberal, moderate, and conservative by dividing the observed ideological range for district courtjudges in the sample roughly into thirds. Specifically,judges were
classified as follows: (1) liberal if the judge had an ideological score less than or equal to
-0.2000; (2) moderate if the judge had an ideological score of between -0.2000 and 0.2000; and
(3) conservative if they had an ideological score greater than or equal to 0.2000.
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seems reasonable to believe that even in the most conservative circuits,
strategic district court behavior might be successful. Indeed, three such
circuits, the Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh, ultimately adopted the intermediate
approach.'
There are five variables in the model that test for strategic decision

making. The first is

DISTRICT IDEOLOGY,

the ideological measure for district

judges. As noted previously, a significant, negative correlation between
TRICT IDEOLOGY

and

INTERMEDIATE

DIS-

would support the hypothesis that the

decision to adopt the intermediate standard was ideologically driven because
it would suggest that, all things equal, moderate judges were more likely than
liberal or conservative ones to adopt that standard. By contrast, a significant
positive correlation would appear to provide some support for the strategic
hypothesis because it would suggest that, all else being equal, as judges
became less moderate they were more likely to adopt the intermediate
standard.
A fundamental premise of the strategic model is the presence of a gap
between the preferred policy position of the median court of appeals judge
and that of the districtjudge deciding the case. Indeed, it may be particularly
important for district courts seeking to achieve policy goals to act strategically in such a circumstance because empirical studies suggest that monitoring is in fact more vigorous in the presence of these kinds of ideological
mismatches.65
To capture this dynamic, the model uses an indicator variable (STRATEGY) that takes a value of 1 where there is an ideological mismatch between
the district and the median circuit court judge and 0 where there is no
mismatch or where the district judge is moderate (and thus under the
attitudinal model would be expected to adopt the intermediate standard).6
The median circuit court ideology is calculated in a fashion similar to

64

See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006); Ottmann v.

Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267
F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001).
65See Susan B. Haire, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Donald Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in
the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 143, 144-45 (2003);
Cross, supra note 4, at 1504-09.
66STRATEGY takes a value of 1 in the following district-circuit combinations: (1) conservative

district-liberal circuit; (2) liberal or conservative district-moderate circuit; and (3) liberal
district-conservative circuit.
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If judges act strategically in response to ideological
disparities between the district and circuit courts, then there should be a
significant positive correlation between STRATEGY and the decision to adopt
the intermediate standard.
The model also includes several second-order effects, which may
increase the likelihood of strategic decision making. First, a district judge
deciding whether to act strategically should consider the likelihood that the
appellate court will review his or her decision. If no appeal is likely, there
would appear to be less reason to operate strategically. Under the final
judgment rule, a decision granting a motion to dismiss is a final decision that
plaintiffs may immediately appeal, whereas denial of a motion is an interlocutory order for which, under most circumstances, defendants may not
immediately seek appellate review.' The final judgment rule is an important
institutional structure that has generally not been considered in the political
science literature, which tends to assume that all district court decisions are
subject to meaningful appellate review.69 Here, the models include an indicator variable (DISMISS) that takes a value of 1 if the motion to dismiss is
granted with prejudice and 0 otherwise. If the intermediate standard is the
result of strategic decision making, then this variable should be positively
related to the decision to opt for that standard.
DISTRICT IDEOLOGY.

7

Out-party senators appear to have less of a role with respect to circuit appointments and
therefore circuit ideological scores are calculated without reference to the circuit judge's
political party. Instead, common-space scores are calculated as follows: (1) if there are no
senators from the president's party in thejudge's home state at the time of nomination, then a
circuitjudge is assigned the appointing president's ideological score or (2) if there was a senator
from the president's party in the judge's home state at the time of nomination, then that
senator's ideological score is used. The home state is determined from the Federal Judicial
Center's Federal Judges Biographical Database, (http://www.jc.gov/newweb/jnetweb.nsf/
hisj), or from the location of the judge's chambers. If there are two senators from the same
party, the mean score for the senators is used.
-28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2004). There are two primary exceptions to the final judgment rule:
interlocutory appeals and writs of mandamus. Neither exception typically results in appellate
review of denials of motions to dismiss in securities class actions. Research revealed only two
such cases during the eight-and-one-half-year study period. See Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 374 F.3d 1015 (11th Cir. 2004); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (lth Cir.
1999).
'See, e.g., Haire, Lindquist & Songer, supra note 65, at 144-45.
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Second, ajudge might attempt to decrease the likelihood of review and
reversal by issuing an unpublished opinion.7' Accordingly, PUBLISHED takes
a value of 1 if the decision is published and 0 otherwise. If published
decisions are more likely to be reviewed on appeal, then this variable should
be negatively correlated with the decision to adopt the intermediate standard. Finally, some scholars suggest that judges seeking to enhance their
reputations or to increase their prospects for promotion would attempt to
limit the number of reversals of their decisions.7 If such judges are also
motivated by a desire to see the law reflect as closely as possible their own
policy preferences, then they may be more willing to engage in strategic
decision making. To test this possibility, the model includes a variable
TENURE, the time in years from when the district judge received his or her
commission to the date of the decision. If judges act strategically when
building their reputations or when prospects for promotion are higher, then
TENURE should be negatively correlated with the decision to adopt the
intermediate standard. Judges who have served for shorter times (and who
may be more concerned with establishing their reputations or who may view
their prospects for promotion as greater) should be more willing to adopt
the intermediate standard.

III.

EMPIRICAL RESULTS

The data set consists of 268 published and unpublished opinions by federal
district court judges on motions to dismiss securities fraud cases brought
under Rule 10b-5, a catch-all anti-fraud rule that is the most common cause
of action in these cases. All the decisions are from the time periodJanuary 1,
1996 through July 31, 2004.72 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the
0

" Donald R. Songer, Nonpublication in the United States District Courts: Official Criteria Versus
Inferences from Appellate Review, 50J. Pol. 206, 213 (1988).
71

See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (1994). But see David E. Klein & RobertJ.
Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 579

(2003).
72

Cases were identified using Westlaw and Lexis searches. Cases were excluded from the sample
on the following bases: (1) they did not involve motions to dismiss or were motions to dismiss
that did not implicate the PSLRA's pleading standard; (2) they were decided by non-Article III
judges (e.g., magistrates or territorial judges); or (3) they were cases where the relevant circuit
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Table 3:
Cases

Descriptive Statistics for Intermediate Versus Nonintermediate
Sample
(N = 268)
Mean!
Proportion

Intermediate
Circuit precedent
Other circuit precedent
SLUSA
Previous 2d Circuit
Judicial ideology
Strategy
Dismiss
Published
Tenure

0.239
-7.849
0.249
0.601
0.313
0.343
0.541
0.287
0.519
10.172

IntermediateCases
(N = 64)

SD

5.705
0.286

0.164

7.428

Mean!
Proportion
1.00
-6.866
0.363
0.828
0.250
0.383
0.453
0.266
0.672
9.675

SD

4.411
0.273

0.149

7.763

Nonintermediate Cases
(N = 204)
Mean!
Proportion
0.000
-8.157
0.214***
0.529***
0.333
0.330*
0.569
0.294
0.471**
10.328

SD

6.031
0.281

0.167

7.333

*Significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01; ***significant at 0.001.
SOURCE: Motion to dismiss decisions in securities fraud actions available on Westlaw and Lexis

and decided between January 1, 1996 and July 31, 2004; Federal Judicial Center, FederalJudge's
Biographical Database, Poole Common Space Scores (ftp://pooleandrosenthal.com/junkord/
BL75107.DAT); U.S. Administrative Office, Federal Court Management Statistics, BiographicalDirectory of the United States Congress (1774 to Present).

variables employed in the model and identifies significant differences
between courts that adopted the intermediate standard and those that did
not. Consistent with the legal model, OTHER CIRCUIT PRECEDENT was significandy larger for the intermediate than for nonintermediate cases. By contrast, there were significant differences in SLUSA, but opposite of what the
legal model would have predicted (the proportion of intermediate cases
adopted after SLUSA was higher than for nonintermediate cases). There
were also a higher proportion of published decisions among the intermediate cases. Although Table 3 shows a significant difference in DISTRICT IDEOLOGY, the difference is inconsistent with the attitudinal model (judges
adopting the intermediate standard were significandy less moderate than
those adopting some other standard).

had already interpreted the PSLRA's pleading standard. Because there were only two cases from
the District of Columbia, those cases were also excluded, yielding the final total of 268 cases.
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Table 4:

Ideology by Standard Adopted

Silicon Graphics
No standard
Second Circuit
Intermediate
Overall

District (N = 268)

Circuit (N = 268)

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

0.230
-. 006*
-0.025*
0.002+
0.004

0.299
0.358
0.382
0.414
0.381

-0.055
0.100**
0.137***
0.143***
0.114

0.136
0.218
0.194
0.216
0.209

+Significant at 0.1; *significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01;
***significant at 0.001.
Motion to dismiss decisions in securities fraud actions
available on Westlaw and Lexis and decided between January
1, 1996 and July 31, 2004; Federal Judicial Center, Federal
Judge's Biographical Database, Poole Common Space Scores
(ftp://pooleandrosenthal.com/junkord/BL75107.DAT); U.S.
Administrative Office, Federal Court Management Statistics, BiographicalDirectory of the United States Congress (1774 to Present).
SOURCE:

A somewhat different picture emerges, however, in Table 4, which
reports the results of a multiple comparison test for the mean ideology of
district judges and circuits, broken down by the standard adopted. In
Table 4, ideology is measured on a -1 to +1 scale rather than by absolute
value of the ideological score. The data in Table 4 show that judges who
opted for the conservative Silicon Graphics standard were more conservative
than district judges opting for either no standard or the Second Circuit
standard. The mean ideological score for the Silicon Graphicsjudges was
0.230, which is significantly different from that of the judges who did not
adopt a standard (mean ideology = -0.006, p value = 0.048) or who adopted
the Second Circuit standard (mean ideology = -0.025, p value = 0.027). The
difference in ideology between the Silicon Graphicsand intermediate district
judges was significant at 0.1 (mean ideology = 0.002, p value = 0.087).
At the same time, the mean ideological score for the Silicon Graphics
circuits was significantly more liberal than for any other circuit. The mean
circuit ideology score for the courts adopting Silicon Graphics was -0.055,
which was significantly different from that of the judges who did not adopt
a standard (mean ideology = 0.100, p value = 0.003), who adopted the
Second Circuit standard (mean ideology = 0.137, p value = 0.000), or who
adopted the intermediate standard (mean ideology = 0.143, pvalue = 0.000).
These data suggest that judges opting for the Silicon Graphics standard were
acting in accordance with the attitudinal model-on average, the most

Law, Ideology, and Strategy in JudicialDecision Making

Table 5: Binary Logistic Regression for Decision
to Adopt Intermediate Standard
Coeff (Std. Error)
Circuit precedent
Other circuit precedent
SLUSA
Previous 2d Circuit
Judicial ideology
Strategy
Dismiss
Published
Tenure
Constant
Observations
Nagelkerke r 2
-2 log-likelihood
Omnibus test of model
coefficients

0.046 (0.039)
1.164 (0.774)
-1.292 (0.504)**
0.169 (0.394)
3.250 (1.169)**
0.918 (0.383)*
0.637 (0.364)+
-1.090 (0.347)**
-0.038 (0.024)
-2.110 (0.933)*
268
0.257
244.282
2
= 50.357 (p
value = 0.000)

+Significant at 0.1; *significant at 0.05; **significant at 0.01;
***significant at 0.001.
Motion to dismiss decisions in securities fraud actions
available on Westlaw and Lexis and decided betweenJanuary 1,
1996 and July 31, 2004; Federal Judicial Center, FederalJudge's
Biographical Database, Poole Common Space Scores (ftp://
pooleandrosenthal.com/junkord/BL75107.DAT.; U.S. Administrative Office, Federal Court Management Statistics, Biographical
Directory of the United States Congress (1774 to Present).
SOURCE:

conservative judges adopted the most conservative standard despite the fact
73
that they were in the most liberal circuits.
Table 5 moves from descriptive statistics to the regression results for
the decision to adopt the intermediate standard. The model correctly classifies 77.6 percent of the cases, although it classifies nonintermediate cases

73

I'his finding should not be taken to mean that conservative judges are more willing to decide
cases ideologically than their liberal counterparts. The sample ofjudges opting for the Silicon
Graphicsstandard is small, meaning that the results must be interpreted with caution. A simple
means comparison does not test whether some other factor rather than ideology is driving the
decision to adopt a conservative standard. Moreover, conservative judges had a larger discretionary space in which to work because the statutory and legislative history materials effectively
precluded liberal judges from adopting a standard to the left of the Second Circuit standard.
See Section I. Nothing in these data suggests that liberal judges would not have acted in the
same manner as the conservative judges in this sample if the situation were reversed and the
interpretational materials effectively precluded conservative positions.
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(94.6 percent) better than intermediate cases (26.6 percent). 4 The model
provides significant support for the hypothesis that the intermediate standard was the product of strategic decision making. DISTRICT IDEOLOGY is
positive and significant, meaning that, all other things being equal, asjudges
become less moderate they were more likely to adopt the intermediate
standard. The attitudinal model, by contrast, would have predicted precisely
the opposite. A one standard deviation increase in DISTRICT IDEOLOGY
increases the odds that ajudge will adopt the intermediate standard by 62.27
percent. STRATEGY is also positive and significant and has an even larger
apparent impact. The odds that the district judge will opt for the intermediate standard are 150 percent higher in the presence of an ideological
mismatch between a conservative or liberal district court judge and the
circuit that will potentially review its decision. This finding suggests that
district judges do indeed consider the likely reactions of the circuit.
Also consistent with the strategic model, PUBLISHED was negative and
significant. All else being equal, published decisions were on average 99.8
percent less likely to adopt the intermediate standard than unpublished
ones, providing some support for the hypothesis that judges write unpublished decisions in an attempt to decrease the likelihood that the court of
appeals will review their decisions. The coefficient for DISMISS was significant
at 10 percent. The model thus provides some evidence that strategic decision
making is a function of the likelihood of appeal. The coefficient for TENURE
was negative, as predicted, but insignificant. There is thus insufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that younger districtjudges were more likely
to adopt the intermediate standard.
The regression model provides no support for the attitudinal hypothesis and weak support for the legal hypothesis. As noted, the findings with
respect to DISTRICT IDEOLOGY are inconsistent with the attitudinal modelDISTRICT IDEOLOGY was positive and significant rather than negative and
significant. Moreover, the fact that STRATEGY is significant suggests that
attitudinalists are incorrect when they assert that judges generally vote their
values without regard to the potential reactions of third parties. With respect
to the legal model, three out of four legal model variables (CIRCUIT PRECEDENT, OTHER CIRCUIT PRECEDENT, and PREVIOUS 2D CIRCUIT) are insignificant. Only SLUSA is significant, a somewhat surprising finding given judges'
74

Standard logistic regression diagnostics were also performed and demonstrated that the
model fits the data. See David W. Hosmer & Stanley Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression, 2d
ed. 143-86 (Wiley-Interscience 2000).
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consistent claims that they accord a great deal of weight to horizontal precedent and very little weight to postenactment legislative history. On
average, cases decided after passage of SLUSA were 99 percent less likely to
adopt the intermediate standard than those decided before. Judges do not
appear to discount postenactment legislative history, despite their protestations to the contrary. Still, given the severe test that this setting creates, even
this weak finding suggests some support for the legal model.

IV. DISCUSSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
The regression analysis supports the hypothesis that the emergence of the
intermediate standard was primarily the product of strategic decision
making. However, the setting for this article represents just a sliver of the
myriad decisions district court judges must make, and therefore the data
cannot tell us the relative frequency of strategic decision making among
district judges or the extent to which the attitudinal or legal models accurately describe other kinds of more routine district decisions.
Nor do these data suggest that strategic decision making is the norm
for district courtjudges even when there is an ideological mismatch between
the district and circuit court. The judges who opted for the conservative
Silicon Graphics standard were significantly more conservative than district
judges in the other categories despite the fact that they were in the most
liberal circuits. Thus, the presence of an ideological mismatch between
district and circuit courts would appear to be a necessary, but insufficient,
condition for strategic decision making. Although other factors, such as the
likelihood of reversal or issue salience,75 may have played a role in this
apparently attitudinalist decision making, isolating the impact of these variables is difficult given the small number of cases (N= 17) and the lack of
variation in the sample adopting the Silicon Graphics standard.
By the same token, nothing in this article should be taken to suggest
that the legal model is entirely irrelevant to district court decision making.
Existing studies of routine district court decision making suggest that ideo-

7

'The Ninth Circuit is one of two circuits (the other being the Second Circuit) where approximately 50 percent of securities class actions are filed.
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76
logical differences among judges do not significantly impact outcomes.
Even though the highly indeterminate nature of this statutory interpretation
question created a severe test for the legal model, one legal model variable
was significant. The failure to find significance for the remaining variables
should therefore not be taken to mean that precedent is irrelevant to district
court decision making.
Given the complex nature of human decision making, it seems unlikely
that there can be a one-size-fits-all theory of judicial decision making.
Accordingly, future research on district courts, in addition to looking for
other categories of decisions that appear to exemplify legal, attitudinal, or
strategic decision making, should also seek to identify context-specific variables that cause one or another model to take precedence. What might those
variables be? Most obviously, different judges will simply approach theirjobs
in different ways. 77 The willingness to allow ideological preferences to enter
into the decision-making calculus and the ability to act strategically will not
be uniformly distributed among the population of district court judges.
These differences in approaches and talents would be enormously difficult,
if not impossible, to sort out empirically.78
Still, the data and prior research allow for some speculation on factors
may
be more susceptible to empirical testing. The model suggests that the
that
likelihood of appeal and reversal play an important role, although significant
questions remain. For example, the data support the hypothesis that a
decision to dismiss a case is correlated with a greater likelihood of strategic
decision making. That finding leaves open the question of whether strategic
considerations play a role in case outcomes as well as in legal questions.
The salience of the issue for the district court would also seem to play
an important role in the likelihood of strategic decision making, but it is
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See Ashenfelter et al., supra note 44, at 260; Schanzenbach, supra note 44, at 89. A number of

studies support the more limited proposition that ideology is a significant explanatory variable
in nonroutine, ideologically charged cases. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and
Ideology: Public and Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. L. Rev. 743, 769-78
(2005).
77See Howard, supra note 40, at 160-67 (reporting on differences among circuit court judges'

perceptions of the limits of judicial innovation); John L. Gibson, Judges' Role Orientations,
Attitudes, and Decisions: An Interactive Model, 72 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 911 (1978) (finding the
interaction of role perceptions and attitudes to be a significant determinant of sentencing
practices).
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8See

Lawrence Baum, The Puzzle ofJudicial Behavior 125-28 (1998).
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difficult ex ante to predict its impact. For example, it is possible that as the
importance of the issue increases, the district court will vote its convictions,
that is, that the court's interpretation will be more consistent with its ideological inclinations. Such a relationship may explain why the conservative
district judges in the Ninth Circuit tended to favor the Silicon Graphics
standard. It is equally plausible, however, to suppose that as an issue becomes
more important to the court, it will make strategic behavior more likely
because judges will be more concerned about setting a policy that is reasonably close to their preferences. 79
Finally, this article does not address other kinds of strategic decision
making that could occur in district courts. For example, the legal model
would predict complete compliance with directly applicable superior court
precedents. Once the relevant circuit court adopts an interpretation of a
statute, we should see no instances of districts within that circuit applying
a different standard."0 It is important to remember, of course, that there is a
difference between a district court stating that it is applying the circuit's
standard and faithfully applying that standard. Indeed, this kind of noncompliance can be thought of as a species of strategic decision making and may
be quite feasible where, as here, the requirements of the standard are
imprecise."

V.

CONCLUSION

This article finds evidence supporting the hypothesis that district courts
engage in strategic decision making. In particular, this article finds that the
emergence of an intermediate interpretation of the PSLRA's higher pleading standard is best explained by the strategic model, rather than either the
attitudinal or the legal model. Liberal and conservative judges sitting in
ideologically dissimilar circuits were significantly more likely to adopt the

'Existing studies suggest that this may be true for Supreme CourtJustices. See Maltzman, supra
note 6, at 51 (compiling studies).
l'rhere is substantial empirical support for the existence of this kind of lower court compliance,
although ideological differences appear to persist. See David E. Klein & RobertJ. Hume, Fear
of Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 579 (2003)
(collecting studies).
1

See Rowland & Carp, supra note 44, at 39-41.
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intermediate standard than were other judges. Nonetheless, there is some
evidence that the judges opting for the most conservative standard were
acting attitudinally and there is also weak evidence that the legal model
affected statutory interpretations. Consequently, much more research is
necessary to determine the relative frequency of strategic decision making,
other variables that trigger it, and the extent to which the legal and attitudinal models accurately describe some portion of district court decision
making.

